

Journal of Travel Research

<http://jtr.sagepub.com/>

A Comprehensive Approach to Classifying Acts of Crime and Violence at Tourism Destinations

Abraham Pizam

Journal of Travel Research 1999 38: 5

DOI: 10.1177/004728759903800103

The online version of this article can be found at:

<http://jtr.sagepub.com/content/38/1/5>

Published by:



<http://www.sagepublications.com>

On behalf of:



[Travel and Tourism Research Association](#)

Additional services and information for *Journal of Travel Research* can be found at:

Email Alerts: <http://jtr.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts>

Subscriptions: <http://jtr.sagepub.com/subscriptions>

Reprints: <http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav>

Permissions: <http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav>

Citations: <http://jtr.sagepub.com/content/38/1/5.refs.html>

>> [Version of Record](#) - Aug 1, 1999

[What is This?](#)

A Comprehensive Approach to Classifying Acts of Crime and Violence at Tourism Destinations

ABRAHAM PIZAM

Based on a review of 300 cases of acts of crimes and violence that occurred at tourist destinations around the world in the last decade, a comprehensive typology was created. The objectives of this typology were to classify the attributes of acts of crime and violence, to analyze the differential effects that such attributes have on tourism demand, to examine the effectiveness of methods used for prevention and recovery from such acts, and to identify the parties responsible for prevention and recovery.

Every minute of every day a crime or a violent act occurs at a tourist destination somewhere in the world. For the purpose of this study I define crime as “an act committed or omitted in violation of a law forbidding or commanding it” (Black 1979, p. 334) and violence as “an unjust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the accompaniment of vehemence, outrage or fury” (Black 1979, p. 1408). I intentionally distinguish between the two concepts, although in many cases, acts of violence are considered crimes, such as assault, battery, rape, murder, and so on. In other cases, however, such acts of violence as international wars, civil wars, coups, riots, political protests, and terrorism are considered by some as criminal acts but by others as “glorified acts of struggle for freedom or liberation.”

While some acts of crime and violence are aimed directly at tourists, such as shooting a tourist driving a rental car in Florida or robbing a tourist train in Mexico, others are committed against local residents, political figures, businesspeople, and famous personalities who have nothing to do with the tourism industry. Furthermore, while some of the motives for such acts are economic or social—such as theft, robbery, and murder—others, such as terrorist attacks, riots, and international wars, are political. But as recent history has proven, no matter who the victim is and what the motives of the perpetrators are, when such acts result in bodily harm or loss of life and occur at a relatively high frequency, the image of the destination will be affected and tourist arrivals will decline. Even long before crimes against tourists were highly publicized by the international press, cities such as New York, Washington, D.C., and New Orleans earned the reputation of being unsafe even for their own residents, and many tourists refused to visit them. The same can be said about political and civil violence. Acts such as the Gulf War, the breakup of the Yugoslavia War, the uprising in Chiapas (Mexico), the partition of Cyprus, the Basque terrorist attacks, the Beijing

Tiananmen Square incident, the Los Angeles riots, to name just a few, although not aimed at tourists or the tourism industry, caused serious declines in tourist arrivals and in some cases totally decimated the tourism industry (Bar-On 1996; Gartner and Shen 1992; Hall and O’Sullivan 1996; Mansfeld and Kliot 1996; Pitts 1996; Pizam and Mansfeld 1996a; Richter and Waugh 1986; Ryan 1993; Shiebler, Crotts, and Hollinger 1996).

By now it is evident that most acts of crime or violence that occur at tourism destinations will have some effects on tourism demand. The question that needs to be answered is which acts will have what effect and what methods are currently available for prevention and recovery.

OBJECTIVES

The overall objective of this study was to create a comprehensive theoretical approach that will enable researchers and practitioners to examine the effects of all acts of crime and violence at tourist destinations and suggest methods of prevention and recovery. Specifically we set out to

1. classify the attributes of acts of crime and violence,
2. analyze the differential effects that such attributes have on tourism demand,
3. examine the effectiveness of methods used for prevention and recovery from such acts, and
4. identify the parties responsible for prevention and recovery.

METHOD

A typology was created on the basis of an extensive literature review of criminal/violent incidents at tourist destinations. The review was conducted via examination of case studies reported in English-language newspapers, weekly magazines, and professional tourism periodicals in a period of 10 years. This review resulted in more than 300 such

Abraham Pizam is a professor of tourism in the Department of Hospitality Management and director of the Dick Pope Sr. Institute for Tourism Studies at the University of Central Florida in Orlando.

Journal of Travel Research, Vol. 38, August 1999, 5-12
© 1999 Sage Publications, Inc.



incidences that occurred at major tourist destinations around the world.

The typology identified

- five attributes of the criminal/violent act, namely, motive, victim, location, severity, and frequency;
- three attributes of the effect, namely, magnitude, expanse, and duration;
- methods for prevention;
- parties responsible for prevention;
- methods for recovery; and
- parties responsible for recovery.

The interaction between motives (4 categories), victims (5 categories), location (2 categories), severity (4 categories), and frequency (4 categories) resulted in a total of 640 types of criminal/violent acts. These *ideal types* were then inserted into a matrix to examine their effects on tourism demand. Regrettably, the literature review neither provided us with a sufficient number of cases to cover all 640 ideal types nor gave us a clear indication of the differential effects of each type of act on tourism demand. To overcome this obstacle, a series of interviews were conducted with law enforcement officials, tourism security and safety personnel, and marketing professionals in tourism enterprises. The objective of these interviews was to fill in the literature review gaps regarding

1. the differential effects that criminal/violent acts have on tourism destinations,
2. the evaluation of the effectiveness of various methods of prevention and recovery from such incidences, and
3. the identification of the parties responsible for prevention and recovery.

RESULTS

In this section, I will present first a graphic representation of the ensuing typology and then discuss in some detail the justification and rationale for inclusion of each variable and the results obtained from my analysis.

Graphic Representation

As previously indicated, the typology resulted in the identification of the following attributes of acts, effects, prevention and recovery methods, and responsible parties:

1. Nature of criminal/violent act

Motive

- Economic
- Social
- Political
- Personal

Victim

- Residents
- Political figures
- Famous personalities
- Tourists
- Businesses (all types)

Location

- Off-tourism business premises
- On-tourism business premises

Severity

- Loss of property
- Bodily harm
- Loss of life
- Mass destruction of life and property

Frequency

- Rare (once a year or less)
- Occasional (2-3 times a year)
- Rapid succession (every month)
- Constant (several times a month)

Type

- Crime
- Civil or political unrest
- Riots
- Terrorism
- War

2. Effects on tourism demand

Intensity

- No effect
- Slight decrease
- Significant decrease
- Drastic decrease
- Cessation

Expanse (geographic area affected)

- Local
- Regional
- National
- International

Duration

- Short (a few weeks)
- Medium (2-4 months)
- Long (more than one tourism season)
- Indefinite

3. Prevention methods

- Legislation
- Enforcement
- Safety and security training for employees
- Installation of security devices
- Tourist education
- Citizens' awareness
- CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design)
- Social change
- Political solutions
- International agreements

4. Parties responsible for prevention

- Law enforcement agencies
- Community
- Tourism Industry
- Tourists
- Businesses
- Government
- International community

5. Recovery methods

- Information dissemination
- Tourists
- Citizens
- Employees
- Publicity and public relations
- Marketing
- Pricing
- Packaging
- Positioning
- Promotion

6. Parties responsible for recovery

Governments
Tourism industry
Businesses
Community

As previously indicated, following the creation of the ideal typology and its refinement based on interviews with practitioners and experts, I succeeded in partially filling the literature gaps and managed to analyze the effects of 282 types of criminal/violent acts on tourism demand. Table 1 represents a one-page example of the resultant matrix.

Discussion and Rationale

Nature of the Criminal/Violent Acts

Motive. Criminal and violent acts occurred at tourist destinations for a multitude of motives. Hence, does the motive of crime determine the magnitude of the impact? Can we say that a particular motive will have more dangerous implications for the tourism industry than others? Before we can answer this question these motives had to be identified and classified.

Newspaper reports and discussions with law enforcement officials suggest that violent and criminal acts at tourist destinations occur for various motives. The bulk of the nonviolent criminal acts such as thefts, robberies, and burglaries are committed for *economic motives*. The criminal wants to make a quick buck and the victim happens to be an easy mark. Such crimes may occur at higher frequencies in tourist destinations because the opportunities for success—that is, plenty of wealth and gullible tourists—are abundant. But economic motivation does not always lead to nonviolent acts. Sometimes, in the process of committing criminal acts for economic motives, violence takes place and the end result is assault, rape, or murder. Economically motivated criminal incidences that resulted in both violent and nonviolent acts have occurred at numerous famous tourist destinations such as New Orleans, Miami, Orlando, New York, Las Vegas, Rio de Janeiro, Mexico City, Johannesburg, and many others.

In some cases, the underlying motive for committing criminal acts at tourist destinations is *social* rather than economic. Criminals convince themselves that by committing such acts as theft, burglary, vandalism, or arson, they address a social injustice that was committed against members of their group. In the minds of these criminals, these acts are especially justified against tourists who are perceived to be fat cats who spend so frivolously on vacations. This modern Robin Hood phenomenon of robbing the rich (meaning the tourists) and giving to the poor (meaning the disadvantaged social group to which the criminals belong) occurs in destinations where there is a large gap between the poor and the affluent symbols of the tourism industry (i.e., Miami, Mexico City, Rio de Janeiro, etc.).

Violence at tourism destinations occurs for *political* and *religious* motives as well. Terrorists, whose actions are driven by a desire to address a political or religious injustice, have chosen tourist destinations because of their high visibility and exposure to the international media. Tourists are not singled out for terrorist attacks because they are easy marks

or affluent, but because by striking against them the cause of the terrorists will be heard all around the world. Furthermore, by damaging the tourism industry, which in many countries is the main foreign exchange earner, the terrorists manage to impair the national economy and its political establishment. Such cases occurred in Egypt, Israel, Turkey (Kurdistan), Sri-Lanka, India (Kashmir), and even the United Kingdom.

Finally, crimes and violence at tourism destinations can also be motivated by *personal* reasons. In such cases the victim and criminal know each other and have had some personal relationship. From time to time, one reads newspaper reports about violent crimes such as murder or rape that occurred at tourist destinations and were motivated by revenge or jealousy.

Victim. The victims of criminal or violent acts occurring at tourist destinations can be local residents, political figures, famous personalities, tourists, or businesses and their proprietors.

Most tourism safety and security experts have correctly identified and analyzed the negative effects of criminal or violent acts committed *against tourists*, at tourist destinations. By now there is a cumulative body of evidence that shows that serious acts of violence (i.e., murder, rape, and terrorist attacks) committed against tourists can cause significant declines in tourist demand (Shiebler, Crotts, and Hollinger 1996; Pizam and Mansfeld 1996a, 1996b; Lankford 1996). What has not been sufficiently discussed is that acts of violence and crimes committed against local residents, political figures, and famous personalities can also have an effect on tourism demand.

Tourist destinations that experienced a high rate of crime against their *local residents* in the past (i.e., New York City or Washington, D.C.) acquired the image of an unsafe destination, which caused a significant reduction in their tourist visitation. Similarly, violent acts committed against *political figures* or *famous personalities* at tourism destinations have also affected the image of tourism destinations and resulted in a decline in demand. Such was the case in Spain and Mexico where political figures were killed while visiting tourism destinations and in Miami's South Beach where the famous designer Gianni Versace was murdered on the steps of his own house. In all three cases the result was a temporary decline in tourist visitation.

Location of the act. Does the location of the criminal or violent act affect the magnitude of the impact? Can we say that crimes or violent acts that are committed *on the premises* of tourism enterprises (i.e., in hotels, restaurants, theme parks, etc.) have a greater impact on demand than those that are committed *off the premises*? Common sense would suggest that acts committed on the premises of tourism enterprises would have greater visibility and result in a more negative publicity than those committed off premises. But until presently, few if any scholars and/or practitioners have given sufficient attention to this issue.

Severity of the act. One would justifiably assume that the severity of the criminal/violent act would affect the magnitude of the impact. Acts that cause *mass destruction of life and property*—such as war and terrorism—would have a more devastating effect on tourism demand than acts that

TABLE 1
SAMPLE CLASSIFICATION MATRIX: THE EFFECTS OF ACTS OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE ON TOURISM DEMAND

Act						Effect			Prevention		Recovery	
Motive	Victim	Location	Severity	Frequency	Type	Demand	Expanse	Duration	Responsible for Prevention	Prevention Method	Responsible for Recovery	Recovery Method
Economic	Residents	Off/T/P	Loss of prop.	Rap. succ.	Crime	No effect	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Economic	Residents	Off/T/P	Bodily harm	Constant	Crime	Slight decr.	Local	Short	LEA+C	Enf.+CA+SC	C+govt.	Ed+In+P/PR
Economic	Residents	Off/T/P	Loss of life	Constant	Crime	Significant decr.	Regional	Medium	LEA+C	Enf.+CA+SC	C+govt.	Ed+In+P/PR
Economic	Famous per.	Off/T/P	Loss of prop.	Rap. succ.	Crime	No effect	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Economic	Famous per.	Off/T/P	Bodily harm	Occasional	Crime	Slight decr.	Regional	Short	LEA+C	Enf.+CA+SC	C+govt.	Ed+In+P/PR
Economic	Famous per.	Off/T/P	Loss of life	Rap. succ.	Crime	Significant decr.	International	Medium	LEA+C	Enf.+CA+SC	C+govt.	Ed+In+P/PR
Economic	Famous per.	On/T/P	Loss of prop.	Rap. succ.	Crime	Slight decr.	National	Short	LEA+T/Ind.	SST+ISD+CPTED+SC	T/Ind.	Ed + In + P/PR
Economic	Famous per.	On/T/P	Bodily harm	Constant	Crime	Significant decr.	International	Short	LEA+T/Ind.	SST+ISD+CPTED+SC	T/Ind.	Ed + In + P/PR
Economic	Famous per.	On/T/P	Loss of life	Rap. succ.	Crime	Drastic decr.	International	Long	LEA+T/Ind.	SST+ISD+CPTED+SC	T/Ind.	Ed + In + P/PR
Economic	Tourists	Off/T/P	Loss of prop.	Rap. succ.	Crime	Slight decr.	International	Medium	LEA+T/Ind.+C+T	Enf.+CA+SC+L	Govt.+T/Ind.	Ed+In+P/PR+Mktg
Economic	Tourists	Off/T/P	Bodily harm	Constant	Crime	Significant decr.	International	Long	LEA+T/Ind.+C+T	Enf.+CA+SC+L	Govt.+T/Ind.	Ed+In+P/PR+Mktg
Economic	Tourists	Off/T/P	Loss of life	Occasional	Crime	Slight decr.	International	Short	LEA+T/Ind.+C+T	Enf.+CA+SC+L	Govt.+T/Ind.	Ed+In+P/PR+Mktg
Economic	Tourists	On/T/P	Loss of prop.	Rap. succ.	Crime	Slight decr.	International	Medium	LEA+T/Ind.+C+T	SST+ISD+CPTED+SC	T/Ind.	Ed+In+P/PR+Mktg
Economic	Tourists	On/T/P	Bodily harm	Constant	Crime	Significant decr.	International	Long	LEA+T/Ind.+C+T	SST+ISD+CPTED+SC	T/Ind.	Ed+In+P/PR+Mktg
Economic	Tourists	On/T/P	Loss of life	Occasional	Crime	Slight decr.	International	Short	LEA+T/Ind.+C+T	SST+ISD+CPTED+SC	T/Ind.	Ed+In+P/PR+Mktg
Economic	Bus.	N/T	Loss of prop.	Constant	Crime	No effect	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Economic	Bus.	N/T	Bodily harm	Rap. succ.	Crime	Slight decr.	Regional	Short	LEA+bus.	Enf.+CA+SC+SST	Govt.+bus.	Ed+In+P/PR+Mktg
Economic	Bus.	N/T	Loss of life	Rap. succ.	Crime	Slight decr.	Regional	Short	LEA+bus.	Enf.+CA+SC+SST	Govt.+bus.	Ed+In+P/PR+Mktg
Economic	Bus.	Tour	Loss of prop.	Constant	Crime	Slight decr.	Regional	Short	LEA+T/Ind.	SST+ISD+CPTED+SC	T/Ind.	Ed+In+P/PR+Mktg
Economic	Bus.	Tour	Bodily harm	Rap. succ.	Crime	Slight decr.	Regional	Short	LEA+T/Ind.	SST+ISD+CPTED+SC	T/Ind.	Ed+In+P/PR+Mktg
Economic	Bus.	Tour	Loss of life	Rap. succ.	Crime	Significant decr.	National	Long	LEA+T/Ind.	SST+ISD+CPTED+SC	T/Ind.	Ed+In+P/PR+Mktg
Social	Political fig.	Off/T/P	Loss of life	Occasional	Crime	Slight decr.	International	Short	LEA+C	Enf.+CA+SC+L	C+govt.	Ed+In+P/PR
Social	Political fig.	On/T/P	Loss of life	Occasional	Crime	Slight decr.	International	Short	LEA+T/Ind.	Enf.+CA+SC+L	T/Ind.	Ed+In+P/PR+Mktg

Note: N/A = not applicable; Bus = businesses; Off/T/P = off tourism premises; On/T/P = on tourism premises; N/T = nontourism; Tour = tourism; Rap. Succ = rapid succession; LEA = law enforcement agency; T/Ind = tourism Industry; C = community; T = tourists; SST = safety and security training; ISD = install security devices; CPTED = crime prevention through environmental design; Enf. = enforcement; CA = citizen's awareness; SC = social change; L = legislation; Ed = education; In = information; P/PR = publicity/PR; Mktg = marketing.

cause some *loss of life* (i.e., murder), which, in turn, will have a more negative impact than those that cause only *bodily harm* (i.e., assault and rape). Finally, acts that cause only *loss of property* might have only a minimal or negligent impact on tourism demand.

Frequency of act. The more frequent the criminal/violent acts occur, the greater is their impact on tourism demand. Since tourists' memories are relatively short, crimes and violence at tourist destinations that occur at *infrequent intervals* will have a negative impact for only a short duration. In contrast, acts that occur in *rapid succession* or *constantly* will have a serious negative effect for as long as they continue.

Type of act. For the purpose of this study, acts of crime and violence have been classified into five categories: *crimes, civil or political unrest, riots, terrorism, and war*. We hypothesized that these acts will have a differential impact on tourism demand with war having the most serious and devastating impact and crimes having the least.

Effects on Tourism Demand

Intensity of the effect. Criminal/violent acts occurring at tourism destinations can have a range of effects on tourism demand all the way from having *no effect*—such as in the case of infrequent petty crimes—through a *slight decrease* in demand, a *significant decrease*, a *drastic decrease*, and ultimately the *cessation* of all tourist visitation—as in the case of constant terrorism or war.

Expanse (geographical area affected). The effect of criminal/violent acts on tourism demand can be restricted to a *local* destination or expand to an entire *region, a country*, or even a *group of countries*. For example, a wave of crimes occurring in New Orleans, Louisiana, or a riot in Los Angeles, California, may cause a reduction in tourist visits to the city of New Orleans or the city of Los Angeles but not to other destinations within the state of Louisiana or the state of California. On the other hand, the violent crimes that occurred in Miami and Orlando, Florida, during 1993 caused a drop in tourist arrivals throughout the state of Florida. Finally, the 1990-1991 Gulf War caused a drastic reduction in tourist arrivals not just in the Gulf and Middle East region but also in Europe, Asia, and the Pacific region.

Duration of the effect. For the purpose of this study, the duration of the effect has been classified into five categories: *short* (a few weeks), *medium* (2-4 months), *long* (more than one tourist season), and *indefinite*. The recent experience of numerous tourist destinations that have suffered from waves of crimes and acts of violence has shown that in some cases, the reduction in tourist arrivals lasted for only a few weeks and the destination managed to recover quickly. What seems to affect the duration of the decline in tourist arrivals is not just the severity of the acts but also their frequency. Destinations that experience infrequent incidences of crimes and violence manage to recover pretty quickly, while those that have a constant barrage of serious acts of violence, such as Northern Ireland or Israel, do not recover until their frequency is decreased. Last but not least, destinations that experience constant mass destruction of life and property will not recover until the cessation of all hostilities. This hap-

pened in the case of the wars in ex-Yugoslavia, Cyprus, the Gulf, and the Middle East.

Prevention Methods

Recent experience in numerous tourist destinations around the world has proven that acts of crimes and violence at tourist destinations can be reduced by employing a number of preventive measures, such as

- legislative measures,
- strict enforcement of existing laws,
- safety and security training for tourism employees,
- installation of security devices in tourism enterprises,
- tourist education,
- increasing local citizens' safety and security awareness,
- employing CPTED's methods,
- introducing social changes,
- designing political solutions for regional or international conflicts, and
- signing multilateral international agreements for prevention of terrorism (Pizam and Mansfeld 1996a).

For example, in the area of *legislative measures* several destinations have enacted laws that make crimes against tourists a serious offense. Others have provided funds to cover the travel expenses of victims who are required to testify against their perpetrators. To reduce crimes in tourist areas, numerous cities (i.e., Orlando, Florida; New Orleans, Louisiana; San Juan, Puerto Rico; Johannesburg, South Africa; etc.) have created *special police units* that are trained specifically to protect tourists and assist tourism businesses with crime prevention or reduction methods.

Within the private sector, many tourism enterprises have elevated the function of security and safety to the executive level and began *training all employees in security and safety measures*. Many of these enterprises have also embarked on large-scale programs to upgrade their *security devices*. Electronic locks, monitored video cameras, and strict adherence to security policies are common practices in most modern hotels, restaurants, and tourist attractions.

In many destinations, tourists are made aware of the possibility of criminal acts against them and are *educated* in prevention and security measures. In the United States, the American Hotel and Motel Association distributes a safety-and-security brochure to each hotel guest, while some hotel chains provide local guidelines through in-house television or radio. In Miami, Florida, rental car customers are provided with written security and safety guidelines and asked to sign a form indicating that they have read them. Miami has also designated certain roads as "safe roads" and signed them appropriately. When renting a car in Miami, each tourist is given a map on which these roads are highlighted.

Increasing the awareness of the local citizens as to the grave damage that criminal activities and violent acts can cause to a community is another measure that can aid in the prevention of crimes and violent acts. The ultimate objective of such programs is to make the entire community a "neighborhood watch" community where each resident is on the lookout for potential criminals and reports any suspicious act to the law enforcement agencies.

Until very recently, most architects and designers of tourism facilities put little if any emphasis on safety and security,

and they were mostly concerned with aesthetics and functionality. Therefore, it is usual to find numerous hotels and motels with unlimited open access to guest rooms and insufficiently lighted alcoves and hidden corridors that invite criminal acts. As of late, hoteliers and restaurateurs have started demanding that CPTEDs principles be incorporated in the design of their newest properties.

Throughout the world, many tourist destinations (resort areas) are located in the vicinity of poor areas that are inhabited by socially disadvantaged people. The opulence of the typical tourist attraction with its luxurious hotels and restaurants makes a stark contrast to the poverty and destitution of the malnourished locals who live in shantytowns without electricity and running water. To make things even worse, nonlocal people or multinational corporations own and/or operate the majority of these attractions. In such circumstances it is no wonder that some locals will commit crimes against tourists and/or tourism enterprises. To prevent this from occurring it is necessary to introduce some *social changes* that will narrow the gap between the haves and have-nots. This can be achieved through increasing the stake of the locals in the tourism industry by providing them with jobs and/or donating a proportion of the profits to local causes. This policy was successfully used in Fiji where resort operators are required to donate a proportion of their profits to villages in their vicinity. The funds donated are used for public health, education, and other worthy causes and help to improve the quality of life of the local residents.

The ultimate solution to the prevention of wars and terrorist attacks at tourist destinations must be *political settlements*. No amount of security-mindedness and advance preparation can provide absolute protection from the horror of wars and terrorism. Despite this, it is still possible to reduce the risks of wars and terrorist attacks by engaging in *international cooperation*. Most experts agree that since the signing of international agreements for the extradition of terrorists, the number of airline hijacks and other similar terrorist attacks has subsided.

Parties Responsible for Prevention

The current study has identified seven distinct parties which could be conceived as having the responsibility for crime and violence prevention in tourism destinations. These are *law enforcement agencies, the local community at large, the tourism industry, tourists, local businesses, governments, and the international community*.

Current practice shows that no party by itself can effectively prevent crimes and violent acts from occurring at tourist destinations. Despite their resources and expertise, even law enforcement agencies cannot prevent acts of crime and violence. They need the cooperation of the community at large and the local tourism industry. The same can be said for crime prevention on the premises of tourism enterprises. Hotels, restaurants, and tourist attractions do not have the resources and expertise to prevent such crimes from occurring on their own premises. They need the cooperation of law enforcement agencies for training their employees in security and safety measures and identifying security gaps in their organizations. Several destinations (e.g., Orlando, Florida) have recognized the need for such cooperation and established tourist-oriented police units that help tourism enterprises prevent crimes from occurring on their premises.

Finally, both law enforcement agencies and tourism enterprises need to enlist the assistance of the tourists themselves in avoiding risky behavior and increasing security and safety awareness.

As far as parties responsible for prevention of civil and political unrests, and riots, once again there is no single party that can prevent these from occurring. The community at large in cooperation with governments and law enforcement agencies must share the burden for the prevention of such acts.

Last but not least, as we previously stated, most acts of terrorism and war cannot be effectively prevented at the local level; therefore, national governments and the international community at large must work in unison to reduce the frequency of such acts.

Recovery Methods

Once a tourism destination has been affected by acts of crime and violence, a number of steps can be undertaken to minimize the damage and revitalize the industry. This study has identified three major techniques that were used by afflicted destinations with varying degrees of success. These are a combination of *information dissemination, publicity and public relations, and marketing*.

Like the old adage "honesty is the best policy," recent experience proves that rather than covering up the truth or blaming the media for blowing an incidence out of proportion, during the crisis period the best possible strategy is honesty and integrity. Public authorities who faced up to the challenge and admitted that there was a problem while promising to do their best to correct it gained the trust, credibility, and sympathy of the media and the tourist population. Therefore, it is of great importance that current and *updated information* be disseminated on a daily basis to the media, the employees in the local tourism industry, and the tourists in the generating markets.

When crime or violence waves diminish, *publicity and public relations* campaigns are normally initiated. The objective of these campaigns is to inform the world that everything is back to normal and that there is no better time to visit the destination than at present. Destinations that acted in an honest and reliable manner during the crisis and earned the reputation of being credible had little difficulties in convincing the media and potential tourists that things are *really* back to normal.

No matter how successful the phases of information dissemination and publicity and public relations are, experience shows that without increased *marketing* activities, most destinations will not be able to recover from the negative consequences of crimes and acts of violence. Such activities as reduction in prices, sales promotion (i.e., "two for one" or "stay five nights and get the sixth free"), packaging (i.e., all-inclusive vacations), and product repositioning (i.e., from heritage tourism to Sun Sea and Sand tourism, or from international tourism to domestic tourism) have been adopted by such destinations as Cyprus, Israel, Egypt, Croatia, and Slovenia with varying degrees of success. Although not highly publicized, some governments have financially supported their tourism industry in times of crisis. These supports took the form of subsidies, long-term low or no-interest loans, tax exemptions, and so forth.

Parties Responsible for Recovery

Because of the significant resources required to revitalize the industry following a security and safety crisis, both public and private sectors must be involved in recovery efforts. In the aftermath of terrorism and war, governments must provide the necessary funds and human resources to physically reconstruct the industry, rebuild the infrastructure, and promote tourism in existing and new generating markets. In the case of recovery from crime waves, governments must shore up their law enforcement agencies, design new safety and security laws and regulations, finance public relations campaigns, and above all design crisis plans for future protection.

Within the private sector, both the tourism industry and businesses in general are responsible for putting in place all the aforementioned marketing techniques designed to bring the tourists back to the destination.

Last but not least, the community at large through its civic and voluntary organizations must embark on a journey of restoring its self-confidence and thus projecting to the outside world an image of tranquility and peace.

CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of the examination of the entire matrix, we offer the following conclusions stated in the form of propositions:

1. *The relationship between the motive of the criminal/violent act and the intensity, expanse, and duration of the effect.* All else being equal, political motives have the most intense, widespread, and lengthy effects on tourism demand and can ultimately lead to the demise of the tourist destination. Economic and social motives have the second strongest effect followed by personal motives, which have the lowest effect.

2. *The relationship between type of victim and the intensity, expanse, and duration of the effect.* With the exception of very severe acts of violence conducted against local residents (mass terrorism and war), acts committed against tourists have a stronger effect on tourism demand than those committed against local residents, political figures, famous personalities, and businesspersons.

3. *The relationship between the location of the act and the intensity, expanse, and duration of the effect.* In cases of very severe criminal/violent acts, there seems to be no difference between acts conducted on or off the premises of tourism enterprises. In cases of less-severe criminal/violent acts, acts conducted on the premises of tourism businesses have greater effects than those conducted off the premises.

4. *The relationship between the severity of the act and the intensity, expanse, and duration of the effect.* Acts resulting in mass destruction of life and property followed by loss of life and bodily harm have the strongest effect on tourism demand. Acts resulting only in loss of property have the lowest effect on tourism demand.

5. *The relationship between frequency of occurrence and the intensity, expanse, and duration of the effect.* All else being equal, acts occurring more frequently will have a more

intense, widespread, and lengthy effect on tourism demand than those occurring less frequently.

6. *The relationship between type of act and the intensity, expanse, and duration of the effect.* War and mass terrorism had the strongest and most devastating effects on tourism demand. Riots and political or civil unrest had a stronger effect on tourism demand than crimes.

7. *Parties responsible for prevention.* No single party was identified as being successful in preventing acts of crimes and violence.

With the exception of mass acts of violence, the most effective parties for crime prevention were found to be a combination of local law enforcement agencies, tourism enterprises, the community at large, and the tourists themselves.

In the case of acts of riots and political/civil unrest, the most successful combination seems to be the local community through its leaders and the national and local governments.

In cases of war and mass terrorism, only governments and the international community seem to be successful in prevention.

8. *Parties responsible for recovery.* The best combination of parties for recovery was found to be an equal partnership of governments and tourism industry officials, followed by a partnership of governments and the local community.

9. *Recovery methods.* In the most severe cases such as wars and frequent acts of mass terrorism, only political resolutions could lead to recovery. In all other cases, no single method of recovery was found to be successful.

For recovery from crimes, the best strategy seems to be future prevention coupled with tourist education and employee training.

All else being equal, marketing and public relations, despite their popularity, seem to be the least effective strategy.

STUDY LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

Since the results of this study are inferred from a qualitative analysis based on a limited number of cases, they should not be considered generalizable and representative of all destinations. They should be treated as the results of a pilot study intended to (1) classify the crime/violence phenomena and (2) offer some propositions as to the relationship between acts of crime and violence at tourist destinations and their differential effects on tourism demand. It is hoped that future researchers will empirically test these propositions and thus confirm or reject them.

REFERENCES

- Bar-On, R. (1996). "Measuring the Effects on Tourism of Violence and of Promotion Following Violent Acts." In *Tourism, Crime and International Security Issues*, edited by A. Pizam and Y. Mansfeld. Chichester, UK: Wiley, pp. 159-74.
- Black, H. (1979). *Black's Law Dictionary*. 5th ed. St. Paul, MN: West.
- Gartner, W., and H. Shen (1992). "The Impact of Tiananmen Square on China's Tourism Image." *Journal of Travel Research*, 30 (4): 47-52.

- Hall, M., and V. O'Sullivan (1996). "Tourism, Political Stability and Violence." In *Tourism, Crime and International Security Issues*, edited by A. Pizam and Y. Mansfeld. Chichester, UK: Wiley, pp. 105-22.
- Lankford, S. (1996). "Crime and Tourism: A Study of Perceptions in the Pacific Northwest." In *Tourism, Crime and International Security Issues*, edited by A. Pizam and Y. Mansfeld. Chichester, UK: Wiley, pp. 51-58.
- Mansfeld, Y., and N. Kliot (1996). "The Tourism Industry in the Partitioned Island of Cyprus." In *Tourism, Crime and International Security Issues*, edited by A. Pizam and Y. Mansfeld. Chichester, UK: Wiley, pp. 187-202.
- Pitts, W. (1996). "Uprising in Chiapas, Mexico." In *Tourism, Crime and International Security Issues*, edited by A. Pizam and Y. Mansfeld. Chichester, UK: Wiley, pp. 215-27.
- Pizam, A., and Y. Mansfeld (1996a). "Conclusions and Recommendations." In *Tourism, Crime and International Security Issues*, edited by A. Pizam and Y. Mansfeld. Chichester, UK: Wiley, pp. 311-14.
- (1996b). "Introduction." In *Tourism, Crime and International Security Issues*, edited by A. Pizam and Y. Mansfeld. Chichester, UK: Wiley, pp. 1-7.
- Richter, L. K., and W. L. Waugh Jr. (1986). "Terrorism and Tourism as Logical Companions." *Tourism Management*, 7 (4): 230-38.
- Ryan, C. (1993). "Crime Violence Tourism and Terrorism: An Accidental or Intrinsic Relationship?" *Tourism Management*, 14 (3): 173-83.
- Schiebler, S., J. Crotts, and R. Hollinger (1996). "Florida Tourists' Vulnerability to Crime." In *Tourism, Crime and International Security Issues*, edited by A. Pizam and Y. Mansfeld. Chichester, UK: Wiley, pp. 37-50.